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Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty 
Years Makes  
 
 
Jack Goldsmith
* and Cass R. Sunstein
** 
 
 
  President Bush’s Military Order of November 13, 2001 established a legal 
framework to enable Military Commissions to try terrorists associated with the attacks of 
September 11, 2001 on Washington, DC, and New York City.
1 This Military Order was 
greeted with impassioned criticism in the press, the legal academy, and Congress. But it 
hardly lacked precedents. Sixty years earlier, in the midst of World War II, President 
Roosevelt established a Military Commission to try eight Nazi agents who had covertly 
entered the United States to commit acts of sabotage and terrorism. Although the Nazis 
failed in their mission, their aims were similar to those of the 9/11 terrorists. And yet 
Roosevelt’s creation of the Commission, and the subsequent secret trial of the Nazi 
saboteurs, received widespread praise from the same institutions that protested Bush’s 
action.  
 
Our purpose here is not to investigate, except in passing, issues of law and 
policy.
2 We instead explore three other questions: What explains the dramatically 
different reactions? What lessons do the different reactions offer about changes, over 
time, in the legal culture and in culture in general? What lessons do they offer about the 
evolution of protections for civil liberties in general and during wartime in particular?  
 
The most tempting, and common, explanation for the different reactions is that 
there is a significant difference in law – that President Roosevelt’s Order stands on much 
firmer legal ground than President Bush’s order. We show that this and related 
explanations are weak. The different reactions are instead best explained in terms of two 
large differences between the United States of 1942 and the United States of 2001. In 
1942, the nation perceived a far greater threat to its own survival; for this reason 
Americans were far less solicitous of the interests of defendants thought to have 
                                                           
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago 
** Karl N. Llewellyn Dist. Service Prof. of Jurisprudence. We thank Dennis Hutchinson, Bernard Meltzer, 
Eric Posner, Richard Posner, Adrian Vermeule, Detlav Vagts, and G.E. White for helpful comments, and 
Sarah Rispin for outstanding research assistance. 
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cases clearly involved those associated with the September 11 attacks. 
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participated in a war effort against the United States. But this explanation is inadequate 
by itself. It must be supplemented with an understanding of the large-scale, post-1960s 
shift in American attitudes, involving decreased trust of executive authority and military 
authority. Our general claim is that with respect to these issues, the legal culture is 
fundamentally different from what it was before, so much so that many previous practices 
are barely recognizable. We use the different reactions to the Bush and Roosevelt 
Military Orders as a way of obtaining a window on this shift.  
 
After making out these claims, we conclude with some general reflections on the 
evolution of civil liberties protections during wartime. In particular, we identify a 
mechanism behind the trend toward greater protection for civil liberties during wartime, 
namely: A judgment, in hindsight, that past civil liberty intrusions were unnecessary or 
excessive. We also suggest that this trend is, in a way, an accident of America’s 
distinctive history. 
 
I. THE NAZI SABOTEURS AND THE REACTION TO ROOSEVELT’S ORDER  
 
On June 12, 1942, six months after Hitler declared war against the United States, 
four Nazi agents who had traveled by submarine from France landed in darkness on a 
beach in Long Island, New York.
3 A few days later, four more Nazi agents landed on the 
north Atlantic coast of Florida. The eight men had all lived in America before returning 
to Germany after Hitler rose to power; two of them, Herbert Haupt and Ernest Burger, 
were naturalized American citizens.
4 The saboteurs’ mission was the brainchild of Hitler 
himself, who wanted to cripple U.S. military production capacities and demoralize the 
American civilian population. Their task was to blow up aluminum plants, railroad lines, 
canal locks, hydroelectric plants, and bridges. They also had plans for “nuisance 
bombings” of railroad terminals and Jewish-owned department stores.  
 
  Soon after their arrival in the United States, two of the saboteurs, Dasch and 
Burger, decided to betray their mission to the U.S. government. It is unclear why they 
turned. Most historians believe they were motivated by fear of betrayal by the other 
saboteurs, or by fear of detection by U.S. officials. Whatever their reason, Dasch and 
Burger telephoned the FBI office in New York to announce their plot. When they were 
dismissed as cranks, Dasch traveled to Washington, where FBI agents took his story 
more seriously. The FBI interviewed Dasch for five days about the saboteurs’ plans, and 
then rounded up his seven accomplices.  
 
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover announced the capture of the eight Nazi Saboteurs 
on June 27. Hoover insinuated that the arrests resulted from the FBI’s infiltration of the 
Nazi system. But he revealed little actual information beyond the names of those 
involved, how they landed, the weapons they possessed, and their sabotage aims. 
                                                           
3 Unless otherwise indicated, the following account of the Nazi saboteur ordeal is based on Eugene Rachlis, 
They Came to Kill: The Story of Eight Nazi Saboteurs in America (1961); and David J. Danelski, The 
Saboteurs’ Case, 1 J S Ct Hist 61 (1996). 
4 Burger, however, had lost his citizenship by virtue of his subsequent enrollment in the German army. See 
Rachlisat 57 (cited in note 1).  
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Nonetheless, the nation reacted to the news with enormous joy. “The little that [Hoover] 
told was enough to make headlines of a size that had hitherto been reserved for the war’s 
major battles. . . . With no information about how the success had been achieved, the 
public took the news as undeniable proof that Nazi fiendishness was no match for 
American G-men.”
5   
 
The newspaper reports of the saboteurs’ capture insisted that the eight men would 
face the death penalty. Within the government, however, there was considerable 
uncertainty about how to prosecute and punish the saboteurs. One complicating factor 
was that the laws applicable in civilian trials did not permit the death penalty for the non-
U.S. citizen defendants. Another was a concern that Article III of the Constitution 
required the government try the American citizens for treason.  
 
  “If there was doubt in the Justice Department, there was none among politicians, 
the press and most of the public.”
6 Almost everyone seemed to call for the saboteurs’ 
execution – the sooner the better. The Washington Post reported that “[d]emands 
immediately arose among members of Congress for swift justice to the saboteurs – for the 
death penalty if the law permits it.”
7 The general public favored death for the saboteurs 
by a 10-1 margin.
8 A Newsweek essay entitled Death for the Saboteurs argued that “we 
ought to meet this threat with the most swift and ruthless punishment which the law 
permits.”
9 Life Magazine headlined its story of the capture: The Eight Nazi Saboteurs 
Should Be Put To Death.
10    
 
President Roosevelt agreed. “Offenses such as these are probably more serious 
than any offense in criminal law,” he wrote to Attorney General Biddle on June 30. “The 
death penalty is called for by usage and by the extreme gravity if the war aim and the 
very existence of our American government. [The saboteurs] should be tried by court 
martial.”
11 Biddle concurred: “A military Commission is preferable because of greater 
flexibility, its traditional use in cases of this character and its clear power to impose the 
death penalty.”
12  
 
On July 2, Roosevelt issued two proclamations that together established a Military 
Commission to try the eight saboteurs. One proclamation established the jurisdiction of 
the Military Commission and purported to preclude judicial review of its decisions.
13 The 
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6 Rachlis at 173 (cited in note 1). 
7 Felix Cotton, Death Penalty Asked for 8 Captured Spies, Wash Post 2 (June 29, 1942).  
8 Contemporary polls, American Institute of Public Opinion, as reported in Week in Review, NYT, Section 
IV, 2 (Aug 2, 1942). 
9 Raymond Moley, Perspective: Death for the Saboteurs, Newsweek 64 (July 6, 1942). 
10 As cited in Rachlis (cited in note 1) 
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13 The proclamation provided that  
 
  all persons who are subjects, citizens, or residents of any Nation at war with the United States or 
  who give obedience to or act under the direction of any such Nation and who during time of war 
  enter or attempt to enter the United States or any territory or possession thereof, through coastal or  
  4
other named the eight defendants as well as the judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel. 
It also outlined the structure of the Commission in very general terms.
14 
 
Roosevelt’s announcement that a Military Commission would try the saboteurs 
“met with general satisfaction in Washington, as it will throughout the country,” wrote 
Lewis Wood, the New York Times Washington correspondent.
15 “The Presidential action 
calmed the fears of many who realized the delays and technicalities incident to civil 
trials.”
16 A few days later, Wood wrote: “Expectations . . . that the Administration would 
seek the death penalty for the Hitler spies before the military commission chosen by the 
President sounded a heartening note at a moment when indignant Americans everywhere 
were demanding this extreme punishment for the audacious criminals. Americans wanted 
to hear the roar of rifles in the hands of a firing squad, and the government had apparently 
agreed that this is the proper course.”
17 
 
  The saboteurs’ trial began on July 8 on the fifth floor of the Justice Department in 
a room whose windows were covered in heavy black curtains to block all daylight. Major 
General Frank McCoy, the Commission’s presiding officer, closed the trial to the press 
and public “due to the nature of the testimony, which involves the security of the United 
States and the lives of its soldiers, sailors and citizens.”
18 McCoy released 
“communiqués” about the trial that contained adjournment times and other meaningless 
bits of information. He also let reporters view the empty trial chamber, and he released 
photographs of the trial and the defendants. But other than this, the trial process took 
place in complete secrecy.   
 
  Although the Washington Press corps complained about this secrecy,
19 many, and 
perhaps most, commentators did not object to it. Arthur Krock of the New York Times 
                                                                                                                                                                             
  boundary defenses, and are charged with committing or attempting or preparing to commit 
  sabotage, espionage, hostile or war-like acts, or violations of the law or war, shall be subject to the 
  law of war and to the jurisdiction of military tribunals; and that such persons shall not be 
  privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any 
  such remedy or proceeding sought on their behalf, in the courts of the United States, or of its 
  States, territories, and possessions, except under such regulations as the Attorney General, with the 
  approval of the Secretary of War, may from time to time prescribe.  
 
7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942).  
14 See 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 2, 1942) (“The Commission shall have power to and shall as occasion 
requires, make such rules for the conduct of the proceedings, consistent with the powers of Military 
Commissions under the Articles of War, as it shall deem necessary for a full and fair trial of the matters 
before it. Such evidence shall be admitted as would, in the opinion of the President of the Commission, 
have probative value to a reasonable man. The concurrence of at least two-thirds of the Members of the 
Commission present shall be necessary for a conviction or sentence. The record of the trial including any 
judgment or sentence shall be transmitted directly to me for my action thereon.”).  
15 Lewis Wood, Army Court to Try 8 Nazi Saboteurs, NYT 3 (July 3, 1942).   
16 Id.  
17 Lewis Wood, Nazi Saboteurs Face Stern Army Justice, NYT Section IV, 6 (July 5, 1942). 
18 Id.  
19 See Rachlis at 177 (cited in note 1)   
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dismissed claims for open press coverage of the trial as “thoughtless.”
20 The Nation noted 
that “[a]lien sabotage trials are obviously rich in information that can be of value to the 
enemy, particularly to other saboteurs still on the loose.”
21 In this light, it viewed the 
“meaningless communiqués” emerging from the trial as a “victory” for the press.”
22  
 
  The next piece of real public information about the Commission came three 
weeks later, when the Supreme Court announced that it would convene a special summer 
session to entertain the saboteurs’ habeas corpus petitions challenging the legality of the 
military commission. Congress and the public were outraged by the Court’s intervention. 
“The decision to seek recourse in the Supreme Court did not meet popular approval in 
Washington,” reported the New York Times. “On the contrary, there is great 
dissatisfaction here with the length to which the [three-week military trial] has already 
proceeded. . . . On all sides hope was expressed that the Supreme Court would make short 
work of the move.”
23 The Los Angeles Times believed that “[s]uch a hearing was totally 
uncalled for. . . . The Supreme Court should never have been dragged into this wartime 
military matter.”
24 The Detroit Free Press agreed: “Realism calls for a stone wall and a 
firing squad, and not a lot of holier-than-thou eyewash about extending the protection of 
civil rights to a group that came among us to blast, burn, and kill.”
25 So too did the 
Communist Daily Worker. “The unprecedented action,” it said, “is in itself a victory for 
the enemies of America and the United States.”
26  
  
  Some newspapers were more supportive. Arthur Krock, who had earlier claimed 
that the secret military trial was legitimate and fair, saw the Supreme Court’s intervention 
as “a fine service to democracy at war. Whatever disposition the Court shall make of the 
grave issues presented to it, the fact will brighten the American history of a time when 
Cicero’s apothegm – ‘inter arma silent leges’
27 – is the rule in almost every other land.”
28 
The Washington Post, also a supporter of the military commission, defended Supreme 
Court review, noting that “the very circumstances that the Court is meeting to hear the 
petition – this after a long and exhaustive trial of the men by a military commission – 
shows that the saboteurs are being given their day in court.” The Post added that “in a 
time when in so many parts of the world law has become a mockery and justice an 
obscenity, it will hearten the free men everywhere that here in this citadel of liberty law 
and justice still function – even for the benefit of those who surreptitiously invaded our 
land to do us injury.”
29  
 
                                                           
20 Arthur Krock, editorial, In the Nation: When Martial Law Was Proposed for Everybody, NYT 18 (July 
14, 1942). See also David Lawrence, Closed Trials of Nazi Spies Held Right, Washington Star, (July 13, 
1942) (arguing in favor of closed trials for the saboteurs).  
21 The Nation 41 (July 18, 1942). 
22 Id. 
23 NYT, 8-27.  
24 LA Times, Section II, 4 (July 29, 1942).  
25 As quoted in Rachlis at 249 (cited in note 1). 
26 As quoted in Rachlis at 249 (cited in note 1). 
27 “In the time of war, the laws are silent”.  
28 Arthur Krock, NYT, July 30.  
29 Editorial, Habeus Corpus, Wash Post 12 (July 31, 1942).  
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  On July 31, the Supreme Court announced in a unanimous per curiam order that 
the military commission was legally constituted and thus that the petitioners’ were 
lawfully detained. The Court did not provide reasons for its conclusion, but indicated that 
it would do so at a later time.  
 
  Most commentators viewed the Court’s hurried review of the Commission 
approvingly. The New York Herald Tribune described the Court’s action as a victory for 
civil liberties:  
 
The action of the Supreme Court was of real importance to the American 
people as a whole. [The Court] affirmed the right of the President to deny 
the civil courts of this country to those acting under enemy orders who 
[violate] the laws of war. In other words, it gave no comfort to the guilty. 
But by the fact of their intercession the justices of America’s highest court 
reaffirmed to innocent Americans that the law still stands as a shield over 
them, against malicious usurpation or the quick tempers and brash 
judgments of wartime.
30  
 
In all this court drama, American was showing the world that its judicial 
system could give even an enemy invader a sporting chance to prove his 
innocence; even in war time we regarded as important the rights of the 
individual and did not shoot him offhand, as Nazi German would have 
done.
31  
 
The Washington Post similarly stated: 
 
In denying civil justice to the eight Nazi saboteurs, the Supreme Court did 
the expected thing. . . . To handle [the saboteurs] in the civil courts would 
be to help Hitler immensely, and that would be intolerable. We cannot 
afford to give our enemy, in our present pass, the slightest assistance. At 
the same time we are engaged in delivering the world from a tyranny in 
which the rights of the individual have no place. Those rights are 
enshrined in our reign of law. If we simply disregard the law, even in our 
treatment of our enemies, we shall be in danger of coming out of the war 
as Hitlerian as Hitler. That is why the admittance of the petitions for writs 
of habeas corpus to the Supreme Court was widely approved.
32   
 
 The Nation was also supportive, though somewhat more impatient:  
 
A touch of the ludicrous is a small price to pay for maintaining the 
traditions of American judicial procedure. Whatever the fate of the Nazi 
invaders who landed on our beaches in the middle of June we need not 
begrudge them a few extra weeks of life involved in giving them a more 
                                                           
30 Editorial, A Welcome Opinion, NYHT 10, (Aug 1, 1942). 
31 Week’s News Events: America’s Judicial System Tested, NYHT Section II, 3 (August 2, 1942).  
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fair trial. The niceties of jurisprudence, however, can be carried too far, 
and in this case the procedure was beginning to take on such overtones of 
fantasy that the Supreme Court’s refusal to give the defendants standing in 
the civil courts came in the nick of time. . . . Had the Supreme Court 
granted [the saboteurs’] petitions, American soldiers would have to go into 
battle with John Doe summonses in place of rifles and a round of 
subpoenas in their cartridge belts. But the Supreme Court held firm, and 
Ringling Brothers need not worry about having to turn Gargantua loose on 
a writ of habeas corpus.
33  
 
  Unbeknownst to the public, the Military Commission trial ended three days after 
the Supreme Court announcement, on August 3. The Commission found all eight 
defendants guilty, recommended that they all be executed, and sent the 3,000-page record 
to the President for review. On August 8, President Roosevelt publicly announced that he 
had approved the commission’s judgments but had commuted the sentences of Burger 
and Dasch (the turncoats) to life and thirty years imprisonment, respectively. By the time 
of the public announcement, the executions had been carried out.  
 
In their post-mortems, the major news organizations praised the Military 
Commission for its fairness and integrity, the Supreme Court for its quick review and 
approval of the Commission’s legality, and the entire process as a victory for democracy 
and justice.
34 The Washington Post’s analysis was typical:  
 
Americans will read with grim satisfaction the news that six of the eight 
Nazi saboteurs have been executed. [. . .] It was hardly surprising, under 
the circumstances, that many an impatient voice was raised regarding the 
seeming laggardness of the procedure that was being followed and many 
an impatient demand was made that the culprits be summarily executed. 
That certainly was what would have occurred in Germany under similar 
circumstances. But drum-head trials and summary executions are not the 
American way. The very enormity of the crime these eight saboteurs had 
committed made it all the more essential, not for their sake but for ours, 
that their guilt be established beyond peradventure of a doubt, that they be 
given the benefit of able counsel, that all the facts be fully reviewed. All 
this was done. It was bound to take time. Yet actually justice was swift 
and sure. A month after the military commission first convened the verdict 
of this distinguished tribunal was carried out. Nothing was lost by this 
punctilious procedure. But Americans can have the satisfaction of 
knowing that even in a time of great national peril we did not stoop to the 
practices of our enemies. And those who may seek to follow in the steps 
                                                           
33 The Nation, 103 (Aug 8, 1942).    
34 Some, to be sure, were critical. Norman Cousins, for example, viewed the trial as “an ostentation out of 
democratic procedure” that made a “farce out of justice.” Norman Cousins, The Saboteurs, Sat Rev of Lit 8 
(Aug 8, 1942).  
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of the eight will be under no illusion as to what is in store for them if they 
are caught.”
35    
 
The New Republic stated that the process revealed that “even in wartime and even toward 
the enemy we do not abandon our basic protection of individual rights.”
36 The New York 
Herald Tribune, in an editorial entitled “Justice has Been Done,” asserted: 
 
No one can suggest that these men, […] despite the tension of a terrible 
war, did not receive a full and fair trial. Nor, on the other hand, can it be 
said that the issue of the trial has jeopardized the safety of the nation. 
American principles of justice have been vindicated in the eyes of the 
world.
37  
 
Even the condemned Nazis acknowledged that they had “been given a fair trial” and that 
their military lawyers had “represented our case as American officers unbiased, better 
that we could expect and probably risking the indignation of public opinion.”
38     
 
  Almost three months after the saboteurs were executed, the Supreme Court 
released a unanimous opinion – Ex Parte Quirin
39  – explaining why the Military 
Commission was constitutionally valid. The Court first interpreted Roosevelt’s preclusion 
of judicial review to permit review on habeas corpus.
40 It then reasoned that Congress 
had authorized the use of Military Commissions to try violations of the laws of war, and 
that at least some of the acts allegedly committed by the defendants constituted such 
violations.
41 The Court distinguished a leading Civil War precedent, Ex Parte Milligan,
42 
which had held that a U.S. civilian charged with conspiracy against the federal 
government could not be tried by a military commission when federal courts were “open 
to hear criminal accusations and redress grievances.”
43 Quirin held that Milligan involved 
an individual who was not an enemy belligerent and thus not subject to the laws of war.
44  
 
  The announcement of the Court’s opinion in Quirin  was reported with little 
fanfare. We found no editorial commentary about the opinion in any of the mainstream 
periodicals mentioned above. In the context of the events of late 1942, the decision in 
Quirin to limit Milligan and to uphold the validity of Roosevelt’s military commission 
was not viewed as a big deal.  
 
                                                           
35 Editorial, Justice is Done, Wash Post 6 (Aug 8, 1942). 
36 Editorial, The Saboteurs and the Court, New Republic 159 (Aug 10, 1942). 
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38 See Rachlis at p. 297-98 (cited in n. 1). 
39 317 US 1 (1942). 
40 Id.  
41 Id at 26-29. 
42 71 US 2 (1866).  
43 Id at 121-122.  
44 Quirin, 317 US at 45.  
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II. 9/11  AND THE REACTION TO THE BUSH MILITARY ORDER 
 
The reaction to President Bush’s Military Commission was much different from 
the reaction to Roosevelt’s. The public supported the Bush military commission proposal 
by a greater than 2-1 margin.
45 Though significant, this support is more ambiguous and 
less enthusiastic than the public support Roosevelt received in 1942. But the real 
differences in reaction were in Congress and especially the mainstream press and 
members of the legal academy. These institutions reacted with vehement, and sometimes 
strident, opposition.  
 
The New York Times typified the reaction of many newspapers: 
 
President Bush’s plan to use secret military tribunals to try terrorists is a 
dangerous idea. . . . In his effort to defend America from terrorists, Mr. 
Bush is eroding the very values and principles he seeks to protect, 
including the rule of law. The administration's action do[es] an end run 
around the Constitution. . . . [B]y ruling that terrorists fall outside the 
norms of civilian and military justice, Mr. Bush has taken it upon himself 
to establish a prosecutorial channel that answers only to him. The decision 
is an insult to the exquisite balancing of executive, legislative and judicial 
powers that the framers incorporated into the Constitution. With the flick 
of a pen, in this case, Mr. Bush has essentially discarded the rulebook of 
American justice painstakingly assembled over the course of more than 
two centuries. In the place of fair trials and due process he has substituted 
a crude and unaccountable system that any dictator would admire. . . . 
Using secretive military tribunals would ultimately undermine American 
interests in the Islamic world by casting doubt on the credibility of a 
verdict against Osama bin Laden and his aides. No amount of spinning by 
Mr. Bush's public relations team could overcome the impression that the 
verdict had been dictated before the trial began. Reliance on tribunals 
would also signal a lack of confidence in the case against the terrorists and 
in the nation’s democratic institutions.
46  
  
The Times dismissed the Roosevelt precedent for military tribunals as “an embarrassing 
skirting of the legal process.”
47 Other prominent newspapers reacted in a similar 
fashion.
48  
 
                                                           
45 In a survey conducted by NPR News, the Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard University’s Kennedy 
School, 64% answered “yes,” and 26% answered “no,” to the question “Do you favor or oppose military 
tribunals for non-citizens suspected of terrorism who are captured outside the United States or arrested 
inside the nation's borders?” See NPR/Kaiser/Kennedy School Poll on Civil Liberties, as reported in NPR, 
Poll: Security Trumps Civil Liberties (Nov 30, 2001), available online at 
<http://www.npr.org/news/specials/civillibertiespoll/011130.poll.html>  
46 Editorial, A Travesty of Justice, NYT A24 (Nov 16, 2001). 
47 See also Editorial, Justice Deformed: War and the Constitution, NYT Section IV, 14 (Dec 2, 2001). 
48 See, e.g., An Un-American Secrecy, LA Times, November 17, 2001, at 24; Editorial, Military Justice 
(Continued), Washington Post, November 26, 2001, at A24.  
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Many members of Congress also reacted critically to the Order. Democratic 
representative Conyers, the ranking member of the House Judiciary Committee, called 
the order “a civil liberties calamity” that puts “the executive branch in the unattainable 
role of legislator, prosecutor, judge and jury.”
49 Representative Kucinich described the 
Bush Order as “Kafka’s The Trial writ large,” and added that “we should not let the 
actions of terrorists cause us to reject our American system of justice.”
50 Representative 
Bob Barr, the conservative republican from Georgia, stated the “executive order takes 
your breath away, if you read the details of it.”
51 Democratic Senator Leahy accused the 
Bush administration of ignoring “the checks and balances that make up our constitutional 
framework,” adding that it improperly “cut out Congress in determining the appropriate 
tribunal and procedures to try terrorists,” and “sends a terrible message to the world that, 
when confronted with a serious challenge, we lack confidence in the very institutions we 
are fighting for.”
52  
 
  Finally, the legal academy came out strongly against military commissions. Most 
strikingly, a letter to Senator Leahy, drafted by Yale Law School professors and students, 
and signed by over 700 law professors and lawyers, claimed that Bush’s Order authorized 
the creation of institutions that were “legally deficient, unnecessary, and unwise.” It 
added that Bush’s Military Order “undermines the tradition of separation of powers” 
because, in contrast to Roosevelt’s Commission, which was based on an “express[] 
grant[]” of legislative authorization, the Bush Order was “without congressional 
approval.” The letter added that “the use of military commissions would be unwise, as it 
could endanger American lives and complicate U.S. foreign policy.” The letter 
concluded: “The proposal to abandon our existing legal institutions in favor of such a 
constitutionally questionable endeavor is misguided. Our democracy is at its most 
resolute when we meet crises with out bedrock ideals intact and unyielding.”
53 Scores of 
law professors echoed the same themes in editorials across the country.
54  
  
III. WHY THE DIFFERENT REACTIONS? 
 
The reaction to President Bush’s Military Order presents the following puzzle. In 
1942, FDR’s creation and use of a Military Commission was widely viewed as 
legitimate, appropriate, constitutionally valid, authorized by Congress, consistent with 
                                                           
49 See Lawmakers Criticize Bush's Order for Military Tribunals, www.cnn.com/ 
2001/US/11/16/inv.tribunals. 
50 Press Release of Representative Kucinich, November 15, 2001. 
51 Joyce Howard Price, “Unlikely Allies Fight Federal Anti-Terror Initiatives,” Washington Times, 
November 11, 2001.   
52 George Lardner, Jr., Democrats Blast Order on Tribunals: Senators Told Military Trials Fall Under 
President's Power, Wash Post A22 (Nov 29, 2001). 
53 See Yale Letter, http://www.law.yale.edu/yls/c_pages/yls_pa/152/Leahy.pdf. 
54 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Bush Can’t Operate as a One-Man Act, LA Times, Dec. 16, 2001, at M5; 
George Fletcher, War and the Constitution: Bush’s Military Tribunals Haven’t Gott a Legal Leg to Stand 
On, The American Prospect, Jan. 1, 2002, at 26; Patricia Williams, War and the Law: The Dangerous 
Patriot’s Game, The Observer, December 2, 2001, at 26; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Al Qaeda Should be Tried 
Before the World, New York Times, Nov. 17, 2001; Harold Hongju Koh, We Have the Right Courts for 
Bin Laden, New York Times, November 23, 2001, at A39; Judith Resnick, Invading the Courts, Legal 
Times, Jan. 14, 2002, at 34.   
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American democratic and rule-of-law values, protective of civil liberties, and helpful to 
the war effort. In 2001, Bush’s Military Commission was widely viewed to be 
illegitimate, inappropriate, unprecedented, unauthorized, unconstitutional, undemocratic, 
violative of basic civil liberties, harmful to the war effort, and self-defeating. Why were 
the seemingly similar Military Orders greeted with such different reactions? 
 
A.  Unpersuasive Explanations  
 
We begin with four explanations that have some surface appeal but that cannot, 
we believe, explain the different reactions to the Roosevelt and Bush Orders.  
 
1.  Domestic Legality  
 
Many people, including some distinguished professors of law, have argued that 
Congress granted Roosevelt the authority to establish military commissions to try Nazi 
saboteurs, while President Bush’s order lacked congressional approval.
55 On this view, 
the reason for the different reactions lies in significant differences in law. But this is 
untrue. The Bush Order was premised on the identical congressional statute that was the 
basis for Roosevelt’s Order – the very statute that a unanimous Supreme Court in Quirin 
held was “explicit[]” congressional authorization for the President to establish military 
commissions.
56 
 
Some have claimed that the Bush Order, unlike the FDR Order, suspended the 
writ of habeas corpus. But both Orders used essentially identical language in purporting 
to preclude judicial review of the commissions.
57 In the face of the language, the 
Supreme Court in Quirin  interpreted the FDR Order to permit habeas  review of the 
Commission’s legality.
58 By using the same language as the FDR Order, the Bush Order 
is probably best read to contemplate the same type of habeas review as was exercised in 
Quirin.
59  
 
                                                           
55 See Yale Letter to Senator Patrick Leahy (cited in note 39). 
56 See Quirin at 28-29 (“By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly 
provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try 
offenders or offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases.”); id. (“Congress [in Article 15] has 
authorized trial of offenses against the law of war before such commissions.”). .  
57 Both Orders stated that defendants before the Commissions “shall not be privileged to seek any remedy 
or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on 
their behalf, in the courts of the United States.” The Roosevelt Order added “except under such regulations 
as the Attorney General, with the approval of the Secretary of War, may from time to time prescribe,” but 
this provision was never invoked. The Bush Order, unlike the Roosevelt Order, also purported to preclude 
review in foreign and international courts as well. None of these small differences would explain why the 
Bush Order was widely criticized for suspending the writ, while Roosevelt’s was not.  
58 317 U.S. at 9. 
59 As White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales made clear in an op-ed published in the New York Times. 
See Alberto R. Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full & Fair, NYT A27 (Nov 30, 2001) (“The language of the 
order is similar to the language of a military tribunal order issued by President Franklin Roosevelt that was 
construed by the Supreme Court to permit habeas corpus review.”).  
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Far from being on more tenuous ground than the Roosevelt Order, one could 
plausibly argue that the Bush Order is on firmer legal ground in light of the relevant 
precedents. When Roosevelt created his Military Commission, the leading precedent was 
Milligan; the Bush Commission, by contrast, could rely on the more recent, more 
supportive, and probably more relevant Quirin precedent. Because Quirin was on the 
books when Bush created his Commission but not when Roosevelt created his, Bush’s 
Commission has a stronger grounding in Supreme Court precedent. In addition, although 
Quirin held that Congress had affirmatively authorized military commissions in Article 
15 of the Articles of War, Article 15 is probably best read merely as a congressional 
refusal to abrogate a prior non-statutory jurisdiction for military commissions.
60  
 
The Quirin Court may have overreached in concluding that Congress had, at the 
time of the Quirin decision, authorized the President to establish military commissions. 
But Congress re-enacted Article 15 in 1950, recodifying it at 10 U.S.C. §821 against the 
background of the Quirin interpretation. The legislative history to this reenacted 
provision suggests that Congress was aware of, and accepted, Quirin’s interpretation of 
the provision.
61 And this, in turn, makes it more plausible today than at the time of Quirin 
that Congress has authorized the President to establish military commissions. Hence the 
Bush Order has two bases of support that the Roosevelt Order lacked: Quirin itself and a 
clearer congressional authorization.   
 
Our point here is not to argue that Bush’s Order was in fact on firmer legal ground 
than Roosevelt’s. There are other issues that may affect the legality of the two 
commissions in different ways.
62 Our point is simply to show that differences in the 
legality of the two commissions simply cannot explain the differences in reaction to 
them. In fact, we believe that far from explaining the different reactions to the Roosevelt 
and Bush orders, the perceived legal differences between the two orders are a product of 
those different reactions. During World War II, the weaker points in the Executive’s 
position did not receive critical scrutiny, to say the least. By contrast, skepticism about 
the Bush order resulted in intense concern with the legal technicalities and a high degree 
of doubt about plausible legal arguments.  
 
2.  International Legality  
 
                                                           
60 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7 (1946); United States v. Madsen, 343 U.S. 341, 350-55 (1952); see 
also Testimony of the Judge Advocate General of the Army, General Enoch Crowder, S. Rep. No. 130, 
64th Cong. 1st sess. 53 (1916) (in context of Article 15, asserting that military commission “has not been 
formally authorized by statute,” but noting that Article 15 was designed to make clear that the “common 
law of war jurisdiction was not ousted”); Madsen, 343 U.S. at 353 (referring to General Crowder’s 
testimony concerning Article 15 as “authoritative”).  
61 See SEN. RPT. 486, Establishing a Uniform Code of Military Justice, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., at 13 (June 
10, 1949) (“The language of [Article of War] 15 has been preserved because it has been construed by the 
Supreme Court. (Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)).”); H. REPT. 491, Uniform Code of Military Justice, 
81st Cong., 1st Sess., at 17 (April 28, 1949) (same). 
62 For example, Congress declared war in World War II but authorized the war against the al Qaeda 
terrorists on September 14, 2001. There is a debate about the extent to which a declaration of war is a 
necessary prerequisite to a military commission. Compare Katyal and Tribe, supra note 2 (arguing that it is 
a prerequisite) with Bradley and Goldsmith, supra note 2 (arguing that it is not).   
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Another potentially relevant difference between 1942 and 2002 can be found in 
international law. In 1955, the United States ratified the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the 
Protection of Prisoners of War, and in 1991 the United States ratified the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). Neither of these treaties was in force 
in 1942; both of them potentially affect the legality of the Bush Military Order under 
international law. Can the Bush Order’s possible illegality under international law explain 
the differences in reaction? 
 
We doubt it. The severest reactions to the Bush Order, in November and 
December 2001, were premised on violations of American constitutional and civil 
liberties traditions, and not on violations of international law. For the most part, the 
people who criticized Bush’s Order were not at the time familiar with the Order’s 
potential international law difficulties. When complaints based on international law arose 
in early 2002, they did so mostly in connection with the treatment of “detainees” in 
Guantanamo, not with respect to military commissions. Moreover, it is hard to see how 
the international law changes affect the validity of the Commissions, as opposed to the 
procedures the commissions must employ. The Geneva Conventions contemplate the use 
of military commissions, and thus do not call their legality per se into question.
63 The 
ICCPR says nothing about military commissions. While it does guarantee certain basic 
procedural rights such as the right to choose counsel and be presumed innocent,
64 it also 
recognizes that a state party to the treaty may “derogate” from these obligations if it 
certifies that an emergency affecting the safety of the nation so requires.
65   
 
3.  FDR v. Bush, Biddle v. Ashcroft.  
 
FDR was elected in a landslide in 1940; Bush won controversially and lost the 
popular vote in 2000. Attorney General Biddle was a well-respected establishment figure. 
Attorney General Ashcroft is not an establishment figure, and indeed he is viewed with 
suspicion by the left and some on the libertarian right. Relatedly, Roosevelt’s government 
had close ties to the legal establishment (including elites in the legal academy), while 
Bush does not. In the 1940s, actions by the Executive branch met with a much greater 
presumption of approval, at least within elite circles. Perhaps there is a kind of heuristic 
at work in the contemporary reaction. If Bush and Ashcroft are in favor of doing 
something that might be objectionable from the standpoint of civil liberties, some people 
might think it reasonable to assume that the action is, in fact, objectionable from that 
standpoint. A similar heuristic may have been at work in the 1940s. If Roosevelt and 
Biddle were in favor of doing something that might be objectionable from the standpoint 
of civil liberties, many people thought it reasonable to assume that the action is not, in 
fact, objectionable from that standpoint. The heuristic does the work of a more fine-
grained analysis. 
 
We think that this difference has some explanatory value. Distrust of Bush and 
Ashcroft by some elites was hardly irrelevant. But the point is insufficient by itself. 
                                                           
63 See Geneva Convention III, Article 84. 
64 See ICCPR, Article 14.  
65 See id., Article 4.  
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Counterfactuals are notoriously hazardous, but imagine, for example, if a President Gore 
and his Attorney General (Reno? Tribe?) were responsible for a military order akin to 
that issued by President Bush. The critical reaction would have been diminished in some 
circles, but it would have been increased in others. We strongly suspect that it would 
have been far closer to the reaction to the Bush order than to the Roosevelt order.  
 
4.   The Question of Guilt or Innocence.  
 
 There were many salient differences between the authorizations for the Roosevelt 
and Bush military commissions. Roosevelt’s was much briefer than Bush’s. Unlike 
Bush’s, Roosevelt’s applied to U.S. citizens; but Roosevelt’s had a far narrower 
substantive scope. It applied only to persons who entered the United States to commit 
sabotage and related acts. Perhaps most important, Roosevelt’s authorization specifically 
named the eight saboteurs who would be tried by Military Commission. The Bush Order, 
by contrast, applied not just to al Qaeda members and others who committed terrorist acts 
against the United States, but also to anyone who “aided or abetted” the commission of 
terrorist acts or “knowingly harbored” terrorists. And it did not include the names of any 
persons who would be tried before the Commission.   
 
The important point is that it was clear from the beginning who would be tried 
before the Roosevelt Military Commission. The defendants were in hand and widely 
known to be saboteurs; there was no real doubt about their guilt; and their names were 
included in the set of proclamations establishing the Commission. By contrast, the 
persons to whom the Bush Order might apply, and their factual guilt, remain uncertain. 
We speculate that the critical reaction to the Bush Order would have been radically 
diminished if it applied only to people who were already under arrest for helping to plan 
the September 11 attack. One of the palpable concerns of the critics is that military 
commissions might convict the innocent.
66 There was no serious question about the 
essential guilt of those tried before Roosevelt’s commissions. And there is a 
psychological point as well: A vivid sense of the identity of the perpetrators could well 
heighten the sense that an expeditious proceeding is appropriate, and under the right 
conditions, such a sense could also weaken the protests of those who insist on what they 
see as procedural requirements.  
 
But again, this cannot be the whole picture. Here as elsewhere, counterfactuals are 
notoriously hard to assess. But is it plausible to think that military commissions would 
have been uncontroversial in 2001 and 2002 if the defendants were identified, were in 
custody, and were widely viewed to be guilty? It might well be that the identification of 
the perpetrators would, in many circles, have fortified the insistence on the need for an 
ordinary civil trial. We think that the most important and instructive differences lie 
elsewhere. 
 
B.  Better Explanations 
                                                           
66 See, for example, Editorial: Military Justice, Wash Post (cited in note 14) (urging that under military 
tribunals “innocent people likely will be convicted and punished” because “[t]he nature of the rules almost 
guarantees mistakes”).   
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We now turn to two explanations that we think better account for the differences 
in reaction in 1942 and 2001. 
 
1.   Differences in War Context.  
 
The capture of the Nazi saboteurs was one of the first pieces of good news in an 
unprecedentedly large-scale war that had not gone well during the first half of 1942. The 
future of the nation was at serious risk, and everyone was aware of that fact. World War 
II was a “total war” that mobilized the entire nation. Nearly everyone had relatives or 
friends involved in the fighting, and tens of thousands of Americans had been killed or 
captured by the summer of 1942. On the home front, there were daily reminders of the 
war, including rubber shortages, gas rationing, and wage and price controls. Most people 
had a genuine fear of invasion by the Japanese on the west coast; and on the east coast 
German submarines had sunk hundreds of ships. Everything was disrupted; all of life was 
changed. There was no ambiguity about whether the nation was at war, or about whether 
the nation’s survival was at stake.  
 
The events following 9/11 are much different – certainly thus far. 9/11 has 
required relatively few sacrifices or changes in American life. There is a general (though 
diminishing) fear among the population. And there have been (relatively minor) 
disruptions at airports. But we have seen none of the mobilization and sacrifice (or call to 
sacrifice) that characterized World War II, and the United States has suffered only a 
comparatively small number of military casualties. The main imperative to the civilian 
population following 9/11 was not “sacrifice,” but rather “spend.” Many continue to 
question whether military action is an appropriate response to 9/11, whether we can truly 
be at war against non-state actors like al Qaeda, and whether the 9/11 attacks represent a 
true threat to the nation’s survival.  
 
These radical differences in war contexts unquestionably help explain the 
different reactions to the 1942 and 2001 Military Commission Orders. For those who 
view the stakes to be lower now than they were perceived to be in 1942, it is altogether 
natural to question the wisdom of military commissions. Of course it would be extreme to 
suggest that the nation’s prospects for success in World War II would have been seriously 
compromised by the use of ordinary civil courts. But in 1942, the widespread perception 
of a threat to national survival made it far harder for people to insist on the use of those 
courts. For better or for worse, solicitude for the interests of accused belligerents will 
diminish when the risks to the nation seem most serious and tangible. If the current 
situation does not seem like a genuine war, then civilian rather than military trials seem 
more appropriate. If the stakes of the conflict are relatively low, then the justification for 
diminishing civil liberties and protecting secrets is relatively weak. If 9/11 is not a 
genuine threat to the nation’s survival, then the usual tradeoffs of ordinary civilian trials – 
in which erroneous acquittals are the cost we pay for procedures that diminish the risk of 
erroneous convictions – seem appropriate.  
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Some platitudes are worth repeating: When a nation believes that its future is at 
risk, it will not be so careful about the protecting the perceived interests of those who are, 
or who might well be, involving in creating the relevant threat. But here too a cautionary 
note is appropriate. Suppose that the threat posed by the events of 9/11 were thought to 
be far greater than they now are. Would military commissions be widely approved? As 
widely as in 1942? This is doubtful. To be sure, the reaction to military commissions 
would be more muted if, for example, terrorists exploded a nuclear suitcase bomb, killing 
100,000 people. Hence the perception of a lesser threat, in 2001 and 2002, is a 
contributing factor to the public reaction. But it is hardly all of the picture. 
 
2.   Evolving Social Attitudes: Government, the Military, and Law  
 
It is not possible to account for the different reactions to the Roosevelt and Bush 
orders without emphasizing large social and related legal changes within the last sixty 
years. President Roosevelt acted before Vietnam, before the revelations of Hoover’s 
domestic espionage, and before Watergate. To say the least, this was a time when the 
press, Congress, and intellectuals had a much higher regard for the Executive branch and 
the military.  
 
In July 1942, Arthur Krock defended the elaborate secrecy of the Nazi saboteur 
trial on the following terms: “The FBI vouches for the need of secrecy and the 
administration’s lawyers support the legality of the procedure. Unless these lead to clear 
abuses, neither is likely to be called into broad question.”
67 A passage of this sort in the 
New York Times is unimaginable in 2002. In large part as a result of the disclosures and 
rebellions of the 1960s and 1970s, Executive branch officers – Democrat or Republican, 
liberal or conservative – receive diminished levels of trust, at least when there is a 
plausible claim that civil liberties are at risk. Compare in this regard the frequent 
suggestion that President Bush’s order called for “secret military trials” – a claim that 
was not supported by the Order itself, which did not mandate secrecy.  
 
But the cultural difference is not adequately described as involving a mere 
reduction in trust. It involved at the same time a massively strengthened commitment to 
individual rights, not only within the culture but within the legal system itself. Begin with 
culture: In 1942, “neither the country, nor its political and intellectual leaders, nor such 
organizations as the American Civil Liberties Union, were truly libertarian in their 
outlook.”
68 In 1942, restrictions on free speech did not produce a firestorm of protest. 
Libelous speech was commonly regulated, without discernible public objection. 
Commercial speech received no protection at all, while sexually explicit speech was 
heavily controlled, and there was little organized cultural opposition to these practices. Of 
course this was an era of racial segregation, and public opposition to discrimination was 
far more tepid than it is today. Nor did the public insist on what we now take to be 
minimal procedural safeguards for the accused. There is a large question about why, 
exactly, the culture has shifted in the direction of more solicitude for civil liberties and 
                                                           
67 Arthur Krock, In the Nation: Civil Rights in the Saboteurs’ Trial, NYT 18 (July 21, 1942). 
68 See Belknap, supra, at 89. See also Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority 234-35 (Doubleday, 1962); 
Richard Polenberg, supra, at 38-55.  
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civil liberties. Undoubtedly World War II itself play a role, encouraging American 
culture to attempt to distinguish itself radically from those of regimes that did not respect 
freedom. We cannot fully address the causal question here; but it is clear that the shift has 
been massive. 
 
Turn now to law: In 1942, federal constitutional law was fundamentally different 
from what it is today. The Court that wrote Quirin was the same Court that supported the 
Japanese internment in Hirabayashi and Korematsu. Indigent defendants did not yet have 
a right to counsel.
69 The exclusionary rule was yet to be created.
70 Police abuses had not 
yet been held to be generally violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
71 In fact the criminal procedure revolution was decades away.
72  
 
In addition, habeas corpus review has changed significantly since 1942. 
Beginning a few months after Quirin was decided, the Supreme Court began its dramatic 
extension of habeas corpus from a review of jurisdictional defects in prior judicial 
proceedings to something closer to appellate review of defendants’ constitutional 
claims.
73 This expanded conception of habeas was the procedural mechanism that made 
possible the extraordinary growth, in the late 1950s and 1960s, of constitutional 
protections for defendants in criminal cases. Although the Rehnquist Court has cut back 
on the scope of habeas corpus, the writ in its modern guise remains available for properly 
raised claims of constitutional deprivation. Moreover, the expansion of habeas was not 
limited to civilian trials. It has also extended to military trials of U.S. service members, 
even ones held abroad.
74  
 
Finally, military justice itself has undergone a radical transformation since 1942. 
Congress’s enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”) in 1950 marked 
“the most important development in military justice since our founding.”
75 The Articles 
of War regime that governed during World War II was a “command-dominated system . . 
. designed to secure obedience to the commander, and to serve the commander’s will.”
76 
Military justice during this period contained few of the procedural protections of the 
civilian criminal system, and was widely criticized “harsh and arbitrary.”
77 Following 
                                                           
69 Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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World War II, in which the U.S. military fought to preserve American freedoms, it was 
widely believed that these freedoms should extend to the military itself.  
 
The UCMJ applied the civilian concept of procedural justice in a way that was 
consistent with the special circumstances of the military.
78 The UCMJ and its successor 
statutes (such as the Military Justice Act of 1968)
79 established a powerful Court of 
Military Appeals, independent of command structures, that would eventually extend most 
conceptions of civilian due process to military courts. The Military Justice Act of 1983 
continued this trend by authorizing Supreme Court review of the Court of Military 
Appeals.  Today military justice remains different from civilian justice in important 
respects. But as Justice Ginsburg correctly noted in Weiss v. United States, “men and 
women in the Armed Forces do not leave constitutional safeguards behind when they 
enter military service,” for the present system of military justice is “notably more 
sensitive to due process concerns than the one prevailing through most of our country’s 
history.”
80   
 
All of these legal shifts were at least in part a product of the forms of government 
distrust that we have emphasized. In the radically different legal and social world of 
2001, it was much more natural to think that the displacement of civilian courts in favor 
of a more expeditious military procedure would offend constitutional values. In the past 
60 years, the nation has become far more committed to the independence of the federal 
judiciary and to a high degree of civil liberties and criminal procedural protections.  
 
IV. ON THE EVOLUTION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES DURING WARTIME  
 
The different reactions to the Roosevelt and Bush military commissions 
exemplify a persistent theme in the historical evolution of civil liberties during wartime 
in the United States. During every serious war in our nation’s history, civil liberties have 
been curtailed. Following (usually not during) each war, elites regret these restrictions on 
civil liberties because the restrictions often seem – from the ex post perspective when the 
danger of war has passed and the true extent of the threats become known – to be 
unwarranted or extreme. During the next war, the perceived abuses during the last war 
are used as the baseline for determining which civil liberties restrictions are appropriate. 
This dialectic produces a ratchet effect, over time, in favor of expansive civil liberties 
during wartime. Of course there is nothing inevitable to this process. We could imagine 
an opposite effect, in which a failure to provide adequate security was recognized as 
such, in hindsight, and in which the ratchet effect worked in the opposite direction. But in 
the American context, with a remarkable record of military success, the historical trend 
has been toward increasing suspicion of intrusions on civil liberty and civil rights, even 
when national security seems to be at risk. 
 
Arthur Krock of the New York Times again illustrates the point. In a column on 
July 13, 1942, Krock recalled a bill proposed by Senator Chamberlin during World War I 
                                                           
78 See generally Jonathan Lurie. Military Justice in America (rev ed. 2001). 
79 Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968).  
80 510 U.S. 163, 194 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).   
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to punish spies and disloyalists by court martial. The proposal, Krock noted, came in 
1918, when “a wave of hysteria about spies and sabotage has swept the country.”
81 The 
bill died after President Wilson opposed it on the ground that it was unconstitutional, 
inconsistent “with the spirit and practice of American democracy,” and in any event 
unnecessary in light of the Espionage Act and Sabotage Act. 
 
Krock recounted this episode in order to show, in the midst of the saboteurs trial, 
that “the country seems to have grown up” since 1918 with respect to civil liberties. “No 
such proposal [like Chamberlin’s] or anything remotely like it has been responsibly put 
forth in Congress or among the public,” he noted. He continued: 
 
The chapter from past history confers even greater dignity on the 
proceedings of the military commission [for the Nazi saboteurs]. The 
contrast is very great between this deliberate search for truth and justice in 
a case where more summary methods might easily have been invoked and 
what Mr. Chamberlain would have done to anyone merely charged with 
far lesser crimes twenty-four years ago.
82   
 
From today’s perspective, much of Krock’s piece seems peculiar. Wilson’s 
favorable invocation in 1918 of the Espionage Act in an argument protective of civil 
liberties appears ironic, even weird, to the modern observer. For the Espionage Act was 
amended in May 1918 to include the Sedition Act, a statute that formed the basis of some 
of the most notorious, and widely regretted, anti-free speech prosecutions in U.S. 
history.
83 But the contemporary supporters of the Sedition Act, many of whom viewed 
themselves as “enlightened liberals” protective of the First Amendment,
84 were no doubt 
implicitly comparing their acts to the last great war, in which Lincoln suspended the writ 
of  habeas corpus, arrested civilians and tried them in military commissions, seized 
newspapers and suspended their mailing privileges, and much more.
85 Similarly, many 
today have difficulty understanding how Krock could view a (literally) secret Military 
Commission as a dignified and deliberate search for truth. But Krock’s claim may have 
seemed natural in 1942, for his implicit baseline of comparison was the World War I 
experience.  
 
The Krock column illustrates what Chief Justice Rehnquist has described as a 
“generally ameliorative trend” in civil liberties during wartime.
86 Rehnquist notes that 
World Wars I and II were each, by comparison to the prior war, characterized by 
increased congressional and judicial involvement in the protection of civil liberties, and 
diminished governmental attempts to suppress criticism of the war effort.
87 To 
Rehnquist’s catalogue we add the more general point that restrictions of civil liberties 
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that came to be regretted after the war were never again repeated. No President has ever 
repeated Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, his military trials for civilians 
in the United States, or his brutal suppression of newspapers. We have never again seen 
loyalty prosecutions as in World War I, and we are unlikely to do so. The same is true of 
the World War II exclusion of Japanese-Americans.  
      
This brings us back to the Bush Military Commission. Following World War II, 
many criticized the use of some military commissions during the War, especially the ones 
in Japan. But the commissions were not condemned with the same intensity as, say, 
Lincoln’s suspension of the writ, or the World War I speech prosecutions, or the Japanese 
exclusion. In the post-war period, military commissions were not viewed as a horrible 
“mistake.” As we noted above, in 1950 Congress recodified the statute that supported the 
military trial of the Nazis, and in the process appeared to embrace Quirin’s interpretation 
of affirmative congressional authorization for military commissions. In addition, and in 
sharp contrast to, say, Korematsu, Quirin has often been cited without embarrassment by 
the Supreme Court as good law.
88 In this light, it is perhaps not surprising that the Bush 
commission, though subject to criticism, was not unthinkable in 2001, and indeed 
attracted some support among some elites.  
 
It remains to be seen whether a Commission will be used to prosecute those 
connected to the 9/11 attacks. If they are not, one important reason will be the changed 
circumstances – including changed legal and cultural circumstances – we have outlined. 
If commissions are used, they will look far more like civilian courts than past 
commissions. Department of Defense regulations provide that commission trials are open 
except when necessary to protect national security or the safety of participants, presume 
the innocence of the accused, require proof beyond a reasonable doubt, require the 
prosecutor to provide the accused with access to all evidence to be introduced at trial, 
including exculpatory evidence, forbid draw adverse inferences from the accused’s 
failure to testify, provide the accused with a military attorney and allow him to choose 
another attorney, require a 2/3 vote for conviction and a unanimous vote for a death 
sentence, and require at least two levels of review, including one level that can (but need 
not) contain civilian judges.
89 While these procedures fall short of civilian standards 
(especially with respect to evidence rules, the jury, and judicial review), they are in most 
respects like military trials under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, and they provide 
far greater procedural safeguards than any previous military commission, including 
Nuremberg. These procedural advances can be seen as a result of the factors we have 
discussed. In short, changes in the use and structure of military commissions fit the 
general trend we have described. 
 
                                                           
88 See, e.g., Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 245 (1998); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 34 
(1976); Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 685 (1972); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); 
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 n. 68 (1957).  By contrast, compare the treatment of Korematsu in, for 
example, Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 952 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring); Skinner v. Railway Labor 
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 
U.S. 469, 500 (1989). 
89 See http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2002/d20020321ord.pdf.   
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So too do the other restrictions that the Bush administration has placed on civil 
liberties. Civil libertarians have condemned the Bush administration’s monitoring of 
attorney-client phone calls, its treatment of the Guantanamo prisoners, and its detention 
of Muslims on technical immigration violations. We do not express a view on these 
practices; nothing said here is meant to approve of them, for approval would require a 
detailed analysis of each. But compared to past wars led by Lincoln, Wilson, and 
Roosevelt, the Bush administration has diminished relatively few civil liberties. Even a 
conservative Executive branch, it seems, is influenced by the general trend towards civil 
liberty protections during wartime. 
 
There is a potential danger here. The danger is that in an age of anthrax, nuclear 
suitcases, and other easy-to-conceal weapons of mass destruction, the threat posed by al 
Qaeda and other terrorists might warrant tradeoffs between liberty and security that are 
inconsistent with ordinary respect for civil liberties. It is always difficult to gauge the 
seriousness of wartime threats to security in the midst of the war. The problem is 
significantly exacerbated in the context of asymmetrical warfare involving suicidal 
terrorists. Whether the government has made the proper tradeoff between liberty and 
order can be known only ex post. The ameliorative trend in civil liberties is a testament to 
our extraordinary constitutional traditions and legal culture – and perhaps above all to the 
post-World War II shift in legal understandings. It is customary, and sensible, to fear that 
an overestimation of the current threat will lead us to abridge civil liberties in 
unjustifiable ways. But it is not senseless to fear as well that the gravitational pull of this 
trend might, in this or other circumstances, lead some to underestimate the threat we 
actually face.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
  The different reactions to the Roosevelt and Bush orders illuminate a great deal 
about the relationship between war and civil liberties, and about cultural and legal change 
over time. We have argued that perceived legal differences between the orders, far from 
explaining the different reactions, are a product of those different reactions. The 
enthusiasm for the Roosevelt order, and the critical reaction to the Bush order, can be 
explained partly by the much greater perception of threat in 1942 than in 2001. But the 
most powerful and instructive explanation, we think, lies in the fact that with respect to 
actions of the executive branch that might endanger civil liberties, the nation is now far 
less trusting of government, and far more solicitous of the accused, than it was sixty years 
ago. This change counts as a genuine revolution not only in law but also in cultural 
attitudes. An exploration of the radically different social attitudes toward essentially 
identical legal acts is a remarkable illustration of what has happened. 
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